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 THE ROLE OF THE TAX SYSTEM AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
TRANSFERS IN REDUCING INCOME INEQUALITY: 
THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 
The purpose and research objective of this paper are to provide an insi-
ght into the role and efÞ ciency of the tax system and social security transfers 
in reducing income inequality in Croatia. The conception of analysis is ba-
sed on the explanation of the tax system, pension insurance and the welfare 
system in Croatia and a comparison of these systems to similar ones in other 
EU member-states. The main Þ nding is that the system of social security 
transfers in Croatia is efÞ cient enough but there is still a need to improve its 
impact. The underlying ideas of this research are manifold. Firstly, the idea 
of this research is that by using exiting previous surveys and available data, 
one can compare the effect of the tax and social policies in Croatia. Secondly, 
by dividing the government effort into taxation and transfer payment, this 
research contributes to a better understanding of the effect of each speciÞ c 
policy. Thirdly, the discussion in the paper of the optimal policy is used to 
help examine the effect of the government actions, which is an important step 
in the amelioration of the government policies. 
Key words: income inequality, social security, welfare system, social 
transfers, Croatia
Predrag Bejakovi  *
Željko Mrnjavac **
* P. Bejakovi , Ph. D., Institute of Public Finance Zagreb. (E-mail: predrag.bejakovic@ijf.hr). 
** Ž. Mrnjavac, Ph. D., Professor at the Faculty of Economics, Split (E-mail: mrnjavac@efst.hr).
The paper was received on May 2nd 2016. It was accepted for publication on Oct 17th 2016.
             UDK 336.221.4:330.59(497.5) 
             JEL ClassiÞ cation H53, H55, 138
             Review article 
 
P. BEJAKOVIĆ, Ž. MRNJAVAC: The Role of the Tax System and Social Security Transfers in Reducing Income Inequality...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 67 (5) 399-417 (2016)400
1. Introduction
Increasing income inequality is commonly believed to be a world-wide phe-
nomenon, in the minds of many people, linked to growth and globalization and 
capabilities of nation-states (Dervi  and Özer, 2005). There is a constant ques-
tion on the importance of income inequality and its inß uence on the economic 
development. Alan Krueger (2012) has showed that societies with higher levels 
of income inequality are societies with lower levels of social mobility. As society 
has grown less economically equal, a citizen’s ability to move upward has fallen 
behind that of citizens in other post-industrial democracies with lower level of 
income inequality. Thus, current generation’s inequities will be easily perpetuated 
into the next generation and opportunities for upward social mobility will be ad-
ditionally diminished (Greenstone et al., 2013). Inequality also distorts a country’s 
political system. Greatly concentrated wealth leads to huge political power in the 
hands of the few - even in a democratic system with free and fair elections - which 
motivates the government to create rules that favour the rich. Such decision-mak-
ing rulings give ordinary citizens the strong suspicion that the process is unfair. 
Democratic institutions are no longer considered legitimate when they constantly 
produce obviously biased results. Reducing inequality is worth achieving because 
greater equality is likely to increase the overall welfare of all citizens. 
The empirical literature on economic development and inequality can be 
divided into two broad strands. One, following the pioneering work of Kuznets 
(1955), is motivated by the pessimistic conjecture that the process of growth and 
development somehow requires increasing inequality, at least in the early stages. 
This has led to many efforts to identify a relationship between the level of devel-
opment and inequality (Anand and Kanbur, 1993), or to determine whether faster 
growth causes or requires higher or lower inequality. The second strand has sought 
to identify the causal factors inß uencing the evolution of growth and inequality 
independently. This research has looked either at growth, for example, (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995) or at inequality (Li et al., 1997), but has not tried to identify 
those factors that might simultaneously inß uence both growth and inequality. Mi-
lanovic (2003) found strong evidence that at the low average income level, it is the 
rich who beneÞ t from an economic growth, openness, increased trade and foreign 
investment. 
This text is dedicated to the analysis of the role of the tax system and social 
security systems in reducing income inequality in Croatia After the introduction 
(Section 1), Section 2 provides a literature review on social transfers and redis-
tribution. It is followed by the third part oriented to the situation with income 
inequality and analysis of social transfer efÞ ciency in Croatia. Section 4 describes 
the tax situation, pension and welfare systems and their impact on inequality. Sec-
P. BEJAKOVIĆ, Ž. MRNJAVAC: The Role of the Tax System and Social Security Transfers in Reducing Income Inequality...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 67 (5) 399-417 (2016) 401
tion 5 is devoted to the conclusion and recommendations with priority of better 
adjustment of social transfers towards most vulnerable groups. 
2. Literature review on inequality and redistribution
The Þ rst question is: equality of what? In principle the answer is easy - indi-
viduals are equal if they face identical opportunity sets - that is, face the same full in-
come. But full income cannot be measured, so matters in practice are more complex. 
Thus, Firebaugh (2003) deÞ nes inequality as the absence of equality. The human de-
velopment paradigm (UNDP, 2003) deÞ nes inequality as inequality of opportunities 
and choices for individuals to lead full and healthy lives. Income inequality is only 
one dimension of this broad conception of inequality, while other dimensions in-
clude health, education, access to services, and political participation. The literature 
(Aronson, Johnson, Lambert, 1994; Duclos, Jalbert, Araar, 2003, Duclos and Araar, 
2006) provides a number of alternative measures of inequality in the distribution of 
consumption expenditure or income, as appropriate proxies for the standard of living 
and hence the welfare of individuals or equality of opportunity. 
Ordinary people quite often believe that income inequality threatens demo-
cratic deliberation, decision, and the balance of political power because rich citi-
zens can more inß uence political process than those that are not well-off. Thus, 
the reason for progression in taxation is based on equalizing incomes, particularly 
with the exemption of an appropriate amount of income from any tax. Blum and 
Kalven (1953), after analysed the reasons for progressive taxation based on beneÞ t, 
sacriÞ ce, ability to pay, and economic stability and concluded that each is insufÞ -
ciently justiÞ able, deemed that “the case has stronger appeal when progressive tax-
ation is viewed as a means of reducing economic inequalities”. They further stated 
that much of the uneasiness regarding progressive taxation linked to the reduction 
of economic inequalities is caused by too often use of the tax code as the primary 
or sole means of gaining fairness, leaving radical change in the other fundamental 
institutions of society alone. Thurow (1971) also liked the idea of reducing income 
inequality and reckoned it as a type of a public good because people willing to 
maximize their own utility may Þ nd it necessary to redistribute their income to 
some other person. That leads to consideration of Rawls’ arguments in favour of 
just political systems in which the “maximin” criterion of income distribution pre-
vails, where social welfare increases no more than increases in the welfare of the 
poorest individual (Rawls, 1999). 
Taxpayers, burdened by higher taxes, respond with substitutions for what 
they were able to do when they were taxed less. With higher income taxes on the 
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work, they work less and enjoy more leisure time. They work also less intensely, 
producing less. They work more often for barter in the underground economy that 
the tax authorities cannot reach. They work less and do more in professions and/
or positions with large beneÞ ts not related to money. They also constantly search 
for tax loopholes, using part of their remaining assets to Þ nd and pay tax experts 
and advisors. Brieß y, taxpayers substitute efforts that they do not prefer for efforts 
they prefer, reducing their “utility” and, by some measure more often than not, 
reducing the productivity of the economy (Auerbach and Rosen, 1980; Ballard and 
Fullerton, 1992; Goulder and Williams, 1999). Finding that behaviour changes, 
taxable income changes, revenue collections fall below that predicted, and tax 
rates must increase, creating a spiral downwards. Hager (2016) stresses that pos-
sible declining tax progressivity means greater income and assets inequality. That 
increased savings for those at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy and they 
have more money to invest in the growing Þ nancial market which, thanks to its 
“risk-free” status, becomes particularly attractive in times of crisis. But with re-
duced amount of collected taxes there are smaller possibilities to Þ nance welfare 
programmes and help those that are really in need. 
Various authors using different methods and approaches found different causes 
of the increase of inequality. Cornia and Court (2001) believed that the increase in 
inequality is linked to liberal economic policy regimes and the way in which eco-
nomic reform policies have been carried out. A series of papers actually discusses 
both the theory and empirics of growth and inequality in one place and as function-
ally related to each other through several interdependent factors. Acemoglu (2002a) 
underlines technical change and related innovations that favour skilled workers as 
particularly important factors for the increase of inequality, because new tasks are 
more complex and generate a greater demand for skills. Acemoglu (2002b) deems 
that the 20th century has been characterized by skill-biased technical change because 
the rapid increase in the supply of skilled workers has induced the development of 
skill-complementary technologies. recent technological developments have affected 
the organization of the labour market including Þ rm organisation production, labour 
market policies, and the form of labour market institutions. 
The cross-country research by Bacha (1979) on the relationship between lev-
els of income per capita and the degree of inequality conÞ rms the hypothesis that 
as income per capita increases the bargaining power of the poorer part of popu-
lation will increase and the income inequality declines. Using the median voter 
theorem, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) analysed the relationship between income 
distribution and growth. In the circumstances of the more equitable distribution, 
the more capital that the median voter is endowed with, the lower is equilibrium 
level of capital taxation and the higher is the economic growth. According to the 
results of a simple political-economy model of growth and the present cross-coun-
try evidence consistent with it, they conclude that inequality is conducive to the 
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adaptation of the growth-retarding policies. Davies (1986) examining the inß uence 
of various taxes on inequality, shows that efÞ ciency of redistribution is better if it 
depends less on taxing inheritances and more on taxing earnings. This success is 
sensitive to the relative size of mean earnings and inheritances.
There is a growing quantity of research which attempts to explain the rise in 
income inequality during transition. Many existing studies try to Þ gure out the pos-
sible factors behind the changes in the distribution of income using either theoreti-
cal models of transition (Aghion and Commander, 1999; Ferreira, 1999; Milanovic, 
1999, Leitner and Holzner, 2008) or a Gini decomposition analysis (by income com-
ponent or recipient) applied to a single country or a set of countries (Milanovic, 1998; 
Garner and Terrell, 1998; Yemtsov, 2001). Urban (2014a) developed new methodol-
ogy to evaluate the contributions of different tax and beneÞ t instruments to vertical, 
horizontal and redistributive effects using Kakwani’s (1984) decomposition of the 
redistributive effect and Lerman and Yitzhaki’s (1985) decomposition of income 
inequality into marginal contributions of taxes and beneÞ ts. 
3. Income inequality and analysis of social transfer efÞ ciency in Croatia 
3.1. Income inequality in Croatia 
Income or expenditure inequality is usually presented with a Lorenz curve 
and expressed in Gini coefÞ cient. Gini coefÞ cient is bounded between 0 and 1, 
with 0 indicating absolute equality and 1 indicating absolute inequality. It is im-
portant to note that there exist a number of alternative measures of inequality in 
the specialized literature but none of these measures are used as often in studies 
of income and wealth distribution. The quintile share ratio (S80/S20) is an indica-
tor of the income inequality and it measures the ratio of the Þ fth and Þ rst income 
distribution quintiles. 
For Croatia, inequality and poverty indicators from 2003 to 2009 were ob-
tained from the Household Budget Survey (HBS), while those from 2010 to 2014 
were calculated from the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) by 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics. In view of the methodological differences between 
the two sources of data, the indicators from 2010 to 2014 were not directly com-
parable with the indicators for the previous years, but they are completely compa-
rable with the data from the EU countries. 
Nesti ’s (2003) calculations based on the household budget surveys show that 
the Gini coefÞ cient for the period 1978-1998 was in the range from 0.30 in 1978 
to 0.27 in 1983. A moderate increase in inequality in Croatia over the transition 
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period, as follows from this research, is rather surprising. The general perception 
was that inequality went up strongly, although there was no empirical evidence 
either for or against such expectation. Even the World Bank study (World Bank, 
2011), which shows a relatively high level of inequality in Croatia in 1998, does not 
provide any data on the changes in inequality over the transition period. Income 
inequalities mostly stagnated until 2009, with mild oscillations in certain years. 
In 2009, the Gini coefÞ cient (0.27) was lower than in the period from 2001 to 
2008 (between 0.28 and 0.29). According to the 2010 data, the Gini coefÞ cient in 
Croatia was 0.32, which is slightly above the EU27 average (0.31). After the peak 
in 2010, the Gini coefÞ cient in Croatia dropped to 0.29 in 2011 which was below 
the average for EU-25, EU-15 and EU-10. According to the latest available data for 
2014, the Gini coefÞ cient in Croatia was 0.30, which is exactly as the EU-25, EU-
15 and EU-10 average. The quintile share ratio (S80/S20) in 2010 was 5.5 (in 2009 
the ratio dropped in relation to 2008). It decreased in 2011 and increased in 2012, 
but again decreased in 2013-2014 (Table 1). 
Table 1. 





























4.4 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.3 5.5 4.8 5.4 5.3 5.1
Gini 
coefÞ cient
0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30
Source: CBS
Income inequality measured by the Gini coefÞ cient varied by around 10 per-
centage points across Europe in 2012, with the lowest levels of inequality seen 
in Norway and Slovenia and the highest in Spain and Latvia. Only two countries 
(France and Croatia) had an income inequality level around the EU-28 average 
(30.6). In twelve countries, income discrepancies were above the EU-28 average, 
ranging from 31 in Cyprus to 35 or more in Spain and Latvia. 
As general government expenditures have a dampening effect on inequality, 
Croatia is trying to reduce inequality primarily through the tax system and the 
system of social insurance and welfare, which is explained in the further text. 
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3.2 Redistribution as a means to reducing inequality
Each country incorporates its speciÞ city in its systems of social security and 
welfare, depending on the capabilities, traditions, practices and requirements of 
the population. Therefore, many countries vary considerably in form and scope of 
programmes aimed at reducing poverty and income inequality. Today in the world 
there are two fundamental approaches: Bismarck or Prussian model of insurance 
and Þ nance, which is prevalent in continental Europe where rights are achieved 
thanks to the payment of contributions, and the second, Beveridge model in which 
these rights are mostly Þ nanced by collected taxes. Esping-Andersen (1990) dis-
tinguishes three basic models of social and tax policy. The Þ rst is the neoliberal, 
in which the emphasis is on the effectiveness of the market, a restrictive assistance 
policy in which there is great social stratiÞ cation (e.g., in the UK). The second 
is the corporate model, in which there is also high stratiÞ cation, while govern-
ment intervention is provided via market regulation or Þ nancial assistance (like in 
France and Germany). The third is Scandinavian model with relatively high tax 
rates, where the public welfare system is very developed and the state provides di-
rect protection or Þ nancially assists members of society at risk and attempts to en-
able them to participate fully in the labour market or to have security during times 
of unemployment. Regarding tax system, in many countries around the world, ß at-
tax is more and more used. Its main characteristic is one rate (or just few rates) for 
personal income tax (PIT), company income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT) 
almost without exemptions and deductions with the goal to insure the simplicity of 
the tax system and improve the tax compliance of the taxpayers. 
In general terms, the redistributive effect (RE) represents a change in the dis-
tribution of income (or some other measure of welfare) caused by a certain public 
policy. The redistributive effect of personal income tax, measured as a difference 
between the pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefÞcients, is decomposed into vertical, 
horizontal and re-ranking effects. The vertical effect is a measure of the reduction 
in inequality that would occur if equals were treated equally (i.e. if taxpayers with 
an equal income pay equal tax). In other words, it measures the progressivity effect 
of personal income tax. The horizontal effect is a measure of the loss of redistribu-
tive effect due to unequal treatment of equals (i.e. taxpayers with an equal income). 
It is a direct measure of classical horizontal inequity (unequal treatment of equals). 
Re-ranking represents an additional loss of redistributive effect arising from the 
difference in the pre-tax and post-tax rankings of taxpayers. 
ok and Urban (2007) explain that vertical equity achieved through progres-
sive taxation is income-equalising and generally considered ‘just’, while horizon-
tal inequity is deemed ‘unjust’ and detrimental. Therefore, one can differentiate 
between actual and potential RE, with the latter describing the RE that would oc-
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cur if the system were horizontally equitable. The difference between actual and 
potential RE is then our measure of horizontal inequity. High horizontal inequity 
of the current system relative to overall RE should be a signal to policy makers 
that some elements of the tax system must be changed in order to achieve a better 
balance of distributive justice. 
Due to different designs, various tax and beneÞ t instruments have different 
consequences for vertical equity and horizontal inequity of the overall tax and 
beneÞ t systems. The means-tested social beneÞ ts are particularly designed to help 
the poorest individuals or households, while the non-means-tested social beneÞ ts 
are dispensed irrespectively of the recipient’s personal or household income. One 
could expect that the contribution of means-tested social beneÞ ts to vertical equity 
is relatively larger than the contribution of non-means-tested social beneÞ ts, while 
the latter will contribute relatively more to horizontal inequity. While social se-
curity contributions are typically proportional to their tax base, personal income 
tax systems are usually designed to create larger relative burden on higher income 
earners. However, social security contributions may also achieve inequality re-
duction due to their usual payers - employed people - receiving on average higher 
incomes than non-active people that do not pay social security contributions
3.3. Tax system and social security contributions in income redistribution
At the beginning of the transition, the tax systems in Croatia relied heavily on 
direct taxation, so that tax revenues were signiÞ cantly reduced with the fall in out-
put due to the Homeland War (1991-1995) and transition from planned to market 
economy. A stabilisation of revenues was obtained with the cessation of the war 
and the introduction of value added taxes (VAT), which made up a much larger 
share in total tax revenues compared to Western Europe countries. Although it 
is well known that indirect taxes like VAT have a regressive effect, this does not 
inß uence the dispersion distribution of disposable income but only welfare levels 
(Leitner and Holzner, 2008). The effect of the VAT on welfare differences of in-
come groups, however, is not considered in the literature on income inequality. 
Croatia is among the group of transitional countries that shifted the tax burden 
from enterprises towards individuals. The main features of its current tax systems 
were introduced in the Þ rst half of the 1990s based on the ‘consumption-based 
tax’ concept, while later modiÞcations transformed this into a ‘normal’ (i.e. con-
ventional) personal income tax system. The new personal income tax law replaced 
the previous income tax system, under which only some categories of taxpayers 
(mostly the self-employed) had to submit tax returns. Income from employment, 
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domestic pensions and income from self-employment is subjected to progressive 
tax schedule with three tax brackets of 12%, 25% and 40%. 
In Croatia, the main source of income and also the largest source of total in-
come inequality are wages. According to ok and Urban (2007) in Croatia in 1997 
wages contributed to overall inequality 0.3245, and their share decreased to 0.3157 
in 2001. The second most important income source are pensions. Because of tran-
sitional problems and widespread early retirement in the period between 1997 and 
2001, the number of pensioners in Croatia almost doubled and the share of pen-
sions in total income increased. Although the concentration coefÞcient remains 
unchanged, the contribution of the pensions to inequality more than doubled. At 
the beginning of a new Millennium in 2001 income from property represented 
around 2% of the total income in Croatia, which is mostly due to the fact that 
capital gains were not taxed, and dividends were only captured by income taxa-
tion in 2001 (effectively in 2002). ok et all. (2013) concluded that the Slovenian 
tax and beneÞ t system created much larger horizontal inequity than the Croatian 
tax and beneÞ t system, while the redistributive effect was only slightly higher in 
Slovenia. This could be enlightened by the fact that in Slovenian (Croatian) taxes 
made 33.3% (26%) of pre-Þ scal income, against the share of beneÞ ts equal to 2.7% 
(2.5%) of pre-Þ scal income. The reason for this disproportion is clear; social se-
curity contributions were used to Þ nance the expenditures of not only the pension 
system, but also the health system, whereas the respective beneÞ ts that the house-
holds obtained from the latter were not covered by the analysis, except some forms 
of social security contributions. 
It could be brieß y concluded that the tax system is the most important ele-
ment in reducing income inequality in Croatia. The results by the research by ok 
et al. (2013) showed how approximately 80% of redistributive effect is achieved by 
taxes and only 20% by beneÞ ts. This is mostly in contradiction with other studies. 
So, Wang and Caminada (2011) calculated that only 15% of redistributive effect 
can be attributed to taxes. Caminada et al. (2012) found that within rising overall 
redistribution, the public old age pensions and the survivor scheme attributed 60% 
to the increase of redistribution during the period from 1985 to 2005. Social as-
sistance accounted for 20%, and the beneÞ ts for sickness, occupational injury and 
disease, and disability account for around 13% of the total increase in redistribu-
tion. Due to these effects, there is a need to analyse redistribution role of other 
factors, primarily the pension system in reducing income inequality. 
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3.4. Redistribution in pension system
As mentioned, pensions in Croatia are the second most important income 
source and signiÞ cant factor in the reduction of the income inequality. According 
to Nesti  (2003), during the 1980s, concentration coefÞ cients for wages and in-
come from handicrafts and individual farming were relatively stable, with the con-
centration for wages being considerably lower than for income from handicrafts 
and farming. During this period, the concentration of property income and trans-
fers from abroad, as well as reduction in savings were relatively great. Towards 
the end of the 1980s, concentration of pensions turned downwards, while the con-
centration of other social transfers decreased, as suggested by their negative sign. 
The pension system in the modern society has multiple functions: equal dis-
tribution of income of individuals and families throughout the life cycle, encour-
aging individual and national saving, and alleviating poverty during old-age and 
inactivity. An essential function of old age pensions is to redistribute inter-tempo-
rally over the life cycle but there is also intergenerational and intra-generational 
redistribution. 
The intergenerational redistribution is quite obvious and is linked with the 
nature of the pension system; the younger generation is paying pension contribu-
tions for those that currently receive pensions. Here is usually intergenerational 
redistribution, because the older generations (retired in Þ rst 30 years from the es-
tablishing of the pension system) obtain positive transfers because they paid rela-
tive lower rates of pension contributions and receive pensions Þ nanced by higher 
rates of pension contributions that burden the current employees. Current and fu-
ture generations realised negative life transfers because they pay higher rates of 
pension contributions and will receive lower amounts of pensions in comparison 
with previous generations (expressed in the replacement rate - the share of pen-
sion in the wages). The intergenerational redistribution will continue in the future 
mostly because of the demographic reasons: shrinking younger generations have 
to Þ nance pensions of a relatively large number of retirees and will face a more 
and more unfavourable relationship between their pension contributions and future 
pensions. 
Furthermore, there is also an intra-generational redistribution achieved by 
those who were paid better and thus contributed more to the pension fund. While 
the highest amount of salaries are usually not limited, generally there is a strict 
limitation of the maximum amount of pension in the public pension system. Except 
for the minimal wage there is no limitation on the smallest amount of salary, while 
almost all countries have some kind of determined minimum amount of pension. 
There are some other different forms of redistribution in the pension system: from 
men (that live shorter) to women (that live longer), from various social groups to 
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others, for example from better educated and paid to those with lower education 
attainment and lower salaries. 
Redistribution from those who die early to those who live longer, is the fun-
damental nature of any pension scheme. Longevity, however, is not indifferent to 
gender and social status. Women live longer than men and higher-income, better 
educated people live longer than less skilled individuals with low-income. Thus, 
as it is often argued, redistribution according to longevity is directed from men 
to women and “perversely”, from the poor to the rich. Usually PAYG systems are 
blamed for such “perverse” redistribution, but it is important to understand the 
same is true for mandatory funded schemes if they are prohibited from handpick-
ing their customers, for example if they are barred from discriminating against 
women. 
Redistribution by individual longevity - which is often gender-, status- and 
cohort-speciÞ c - is mostly inherent, in the notion of a risk-sharing, pension insur-
ance scheme, irrespective of management and the mode of Þ nance, and we may 
call it endogenous redistribution. There exists, however, another type of redistri-
bution in most public schemes, which should not necessarily be a task of the pen-
sion system, which we shall refer to as exogenous redistribution. Public systems, 
although their objectives have seldom been explicitly stated, are typically called 
upon to perform - in addition to the role of social insurance - the additional role of 
social assistance, identiÞ ed as solidarity. 
Croatian pension insurance system contained two mandatory pillars: inter-
generational solidarity Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension insurance and private 
funded “capitalized accounts” with personal account. Majority of the insured were 
participating in both pillars, paying 15% of the gross wage to the former and 5% 
to the latter. The most important redistribution in Croatian pension system is a 
minimum pension (najniza mirovina) - a pension to which the insured person is 
entitled if his or her average salary was signiÞ cantly lower than the average wage. 
The minimum pension is not set as the absolute amount. It depends on the num-
ber of qualifying years multiplied by the minimum actual pension value. In the 
analysis of the Croatian pension system there is also a problem with regard to how 
to treat contributions for the second pillar: as the social security contribution (as 
some kind of mandatory tax) or as personal savings? 
Income redistribution of the pension system is induced by pension formulas, 
but its strength depends on the macroeconomic and demographic factors such as 
the size and distribution of gross wages, rates of return of pension funds and life 
expectancy. Since long periods are involved, the Þ nal effects are uncertain. In 
the research by Urban et al. (2011) micro-simulation model was developed, which 
converts the input data and parameters into wages, beneÞ ts, pensions and taxes 
typiÞ ed individuals. Based on the lifetime amounts of these variables, the indica-
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tor “pension tax” is obtained, as the difference between the present value of all 
pension contributions paid by the individual and the expected present value of pen-
sions to be received. If the contributions of some individual exceed her pensions, 
she actually “Þ nances” the pensions of other pensioners and in this way income re-
distribution comes into existence. Analysis showed that the pension system causes 
a redistribution of income from individuals with higher incomes to those with 
lower incomes. This increases progressivity of the overall Þ scal system. The ef-
fect of intra-generational redistribution increases with the growth of average gross 
wages and decreases with the rate of return of pension funds. If the life expectancy 
of persons of the same generation increases with income, the redistribution effect 
is reduced. The pension taxes increased the progressivity of the entire tax system 
in which the maximum role has the income tax. 
The Croatian pension system is highly redistributive between the lowest and 
highest income cohorts. The PAYG system awards pension points for each year 
based on individual’s earned income. The average wage equals one point, which 
was 0.76 percent of the average gross wage. According to the World Bank (2011) 
the minimum pension per year of service is 0.825 percent of the 1998 average 
gross wage indexed annually (as pension point value is), which due to indexation 
dropped to 0.734 percent of average gross wage in 2009. Minimum wage earners 
with 40 years of service would earn a minimum pension higher than their last net 
wage (the net individual replacement rate is over 100 percent); and average wage 
earners with 40 years of service would receive some 3 percent higher pension ben-
eÞ t. A minimum pension in Croatia is also comparatively quite high, even for 30 
years of service. On the other hand, the maximum pension is limited to 3.8 annual 
points, i.e. the pension formula is proportional up to 3.8 times the average wage, 
while contributions are proportional up to 6 times the average wage. As a result, 
the net replacement rate for someone earning 6 times the average wage would be 
less than 33 percent. In the following text the redistribution effects of the welfare 
system in Croatia will be examined.
3.5. Redistribution in the welfare system
Due to demographic changes, new economic and political circumstances, the 
social care reform over time, changed signiÞ cantly. The current social protection 
system in Croatia is a mix of old and new programmes that are continuously being 
reformed in response to changing social needs and opportunities to provide so-
cial transfers or services more efÞ ciently. A basic overview of the Croatian social 
welfare system consists of three components: cash transfers, beneÞ ts in kind and a 
range of residential and foster-care programmes. According to the statistics main-
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tained by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth there are different cash transfers 
as well as various types of in-kind assistance provided. In addition, almost all lo-
cal government bodies and many non-governmental organisations provided help 
for particular categories of needy families like poor, the elderly and so on. Cash 
transfers are provided on a much larger scale than in-kind beneÞ ts although there 
are a relatively large number of recipients of the latter. In fact, this is misleading; 
by far the largest in-kind programme involves assistance in paying for public and 
communal services. This is classiÞ ed as an “in-kind” beneÞ t because the local 
welfare ofÞ ce pays the bills of those who receive help of this type directly. Hence 
it does not formally constitute a cash transfer. 
By far the greatest share of social assistance in Croatia took the form of cash 
transfers. The largest of these - both in terms of resources paid out and number 
of beneÞ ciaries was the so-called subsidy for the  subsistence beneÞ t, what is a 
means-tested beneÞ t intended for households whose income is below the “means 
of subsistence”. This level represents the amount of money necessary to satisfy 
the basic needs of the particular household. The total amount of the beneÞ t for a 
household is obtained as a sum of individual contributions depending on house-
hold members’ characteristics. When calculating means of subsistence, children, 
the elderly and people unable to work are automatically accounted; working-able 
individuals between 18 and 65 are not taken into account unless they satisfy the 
conditions for being characterised as unemployed. This beneÞ t was introduced in 
1998 under the name “subsistence support” (pomo  za uzdržavanje). In the pe-
riod from 08/2007 to 05/2011 it was called “permanent support” (stalna pomo ). 
However, in the whole period from 01/1998 to 12/2013 there were no important 
changes in the beneÞ t design. In 01/2014 subsistence support was replaced by 
“guaranteed minimum beneÞ t” (zajam ena minimalna naknada), which intro-
duces the following changes: (a) the contribution of children in the calculation of 
the “means of subsistence” is signiÞ cantly lowered; (b) additional conditions for 
working-able individuals, (c) the wealth test is tightened, etc. It uniÞ es what was 
the basic social assistance scheme (pomo  za uzdržavanje) with two much smaller 
beneÞ t schemes: a beneÞ t scheme for war veterans and their families and a scheme 
for prolonged unemployment beneÞ ts. This beneÞ t is entirely Þ nanced through the 
central state budget. Since the determination of entitlement involved assessment 
by social workers (who enjoyed a fair amount of discretion) it was probably quite 
costly to administer. According to Nesti  (2003) towards the end of the 1980s 
concentration of other social transfers decreased, as suggested by their negative 
sign. In other words, other social transfers (excluding pensions) were well targeted 
towards lower income population groups. 
This was conÞ rmed by Šu ur (2005) who stressed that Croatia at that time 
had a very efÞ cient social welfare system and forms of monetary aid. The Croatian 
social transfer system was in fact even more effective than the average transfer 
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system in the EU (measured according to the poverty rate reduction, not accord-
ing reduction in inequality). Only Sweden, Poland and Hungary had much more 
effective social transfer systems. In fact, if restricted only to social transfers and 
excluding old-age and survivor pensions, then this social security system was more 
effective in Croatia than in any other country. This means that it is necessary to 
take with caution the often-expressed unprepared opinion that Croatian transfer 
system is ineffective, although it is necessary additionally to check the information 
about the high effectiveness of social transfers not including old-age and survivor 
pensions (there is a need to have in mind only the low level of social assistance 
beneÞ ts or unemployment beneÞ ts). 
The Gini coefÞ cients in EUROMOD (Urban and Bezeredi, 2016) and ex-
ternal statistics for 2011 were 29.2 and 30.9, respectively. The difference of 1.7 
percentage points or 6% between EUROMOD and SILC is caused by the cover-
age of social assistance beneÞ ts, particularly the Subsistence and Unemployment 
beneÞ ts, which signiÞ cantly impact the bottom income decile. Furthermore, the 
amounts of these beneÞ ts are notably larger in EUROMOD for given income 
data.
As Croatia became an EU member state only recently, there are no analy-
ses of the social transfer efÞ ciency and comparisons with other EU states in 
reducing income inequality, but there are some valuable studies on international 
comparison on the small scale, with Slovenia. Thus, for example results by ok 
et al. (2013) indicated that Croatia experienced a signiÞ cantly higher pre-Þ scal 
income inequality and a lower redistributive effect than Slovenia. The results 
showed noteworthy differences between the two countries in almost every as-
pect. Croatia had a higher level of post-Þ scal income inequality than Slovenia, 
which was a consequence of higher inequality of pre-Þ scal income, as well 
as of a less redistributive tax and beneÞ t system. The results revealed that the 
Slovenian tax and beneÞ t system created a much larger vertical effect than the 
Croatian tax and beneÞ t system. However, the former system also induced a 
much more horizontal inequity, which cancelled the advantage in the vertical 
effect, with the Þ nal result that the redistributive effect was only slightly higher 
in Slovenia. In both countries, the overall size of taxes was much higher than the 
size of beneÞ ts. The empirical analysis using the new decompositions indicated 
that Croatian personal income taxes and non-pension social beneÞ ts reduce the 
average income distance by 15.6 percent. The redistributive effect could be 6.4 
percent higher if horizontal inequities were eliminated. BeneÞ ts have an over-
whelming role in achieving horizontal inequity, while taxes have a higher con-
tribution in achieving vertical equity (Urban, 2014b). 
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4. Conclusion and recommendations 
Different welfare systems and different social policies lead to various out-
comes in changes of income inequality. This paper does not analyse the causes 
of inequality but investigates income distribution and redistribution attributed to 
social security transfers and taxes in Croatia. The problem is therefore not wealth 
but rather persistent poverty, because the average period of welfare scheme usage 
is very long: 7.3 years for users without education, around 3.5 years for persons 
with college and university education; 2.5 years for the younger welfare recipients 
(between the age of 19 and 29) and 7.6 years for those older than 60 years of age 
(Bejakovic, 2004). And the right way to solve income inequality is not by punish-
ing the rich, but by doing more to help the poor become richer, mostly by increas-
ing their social capital. This means not simply strengthening the bonds of trust and 
mutual respect among citizens, but also equipping citizens – particularly the poor - 
with the knowledge, skills, values, and habits that will allow them to be successful.
Public pension system is a huge apparatus of income redistribution. Some 
characteristics of the Croatian pension system which have important inß uence on 
the amount of income redistribution are: (a) different pension calculation formu-
las for the “old” and the “new” pensioners, i.e. those who have retired before and 
after different changes in the pension system; (b) the rules of “minimum” and 
“maximum” pension; (c) the formula which adjusts pensions according to growth 
of the average wage and price index; (d) different contribution bases for various 
groups of insured people (for example, employed and self-employed). The aim of 
this study was to recognize different sources of income redistribution caused by 
the public pension system in Croatia, and to quantify their inß uence on different 
groups of people. Brieß y, winners of the public system in Croatia are those with 
a short insurance period and relatively low wages, while losers were people that 
had worked full legally required period and/or those with high salaries. Around 
10 percent of contributors reported minimum or very low wages. There is much 
anecdotal evidence of (mainly small) entrepreneurs registering employees at the 
minimum wage and paying wages above that in cash. Sometimes the employees 
are either not aware of their employer’s practice or agree to receive a higher net 
wage now rather than a marginally higher pension in the future. 
Substantial poverty and inequality reduction could be achieved in Croatia by 
careful reallocation of expenditures and improvement of coordination among exist-
ing social programmes. Also there is a need constantly to monitor and survey the 
implementation of particular programmes. In future research it will be necessary to 
study the effectiveness of each transfer programme by itself. In the paper the main 
hypothesis is that the system of tax burden and social transfers in Croatia is efÞ cient 
in reducing income inequality, but still there is a need to improve its impact. 
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ULOGA I EFIKASNOSTI POREZNOG SUSTAVA I SUSTAVA SOCIJALNIH TRANSFERA 
NA SMANJENJU DOHODOVNE NEJEDNAKOSTI: PRIMJER REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA 
Sažetak
Cilj i svrha ovog rada je pružiti uvid u ulogu i eÞ kasnosti poreznog sustava i sustava socijal-
nih transfera na smanjenju dohodovne nejednakosti u Hrvatskoj. U lanku se objašnjavaju porezni 
sustav, mirovinsko osiguranje i sustav socijalne skrbi u Hrvatskoj i uspore uje ih se sa sli nim 
u drugim zemljama lanicama EU-a. Glavni je nalaz da je u cjelini sustav socijalnih transfera u 
Republici Hrvatskoj dovoljno u inkovit, ali još uvijek postoji potreba za poboljšanjem njegovog dje-
lovanja. Polazne ideje ovog istraživanja su višestruke. Prvo, na temelju ranijih istraživanja i dostu-
pnih podataka, mogu se usporediti u inci porezne i socijalne politike u Hrvatskoj. Drugo, podjelom 
javnih politika na oporezivanje i transferna pla anja, istraživanje pridonosi boljem razumijevanju 
utjecaja svakog pojedinog oblika politike. Tre e, razmatranja o optimalnoj politici služe kako bi se 
ispitali utjecaji javnog djelovanja, što je važan korak u unapre enju javnih politika.
Klju ne rije i: dohodovna nejednakost, mirovinski sustav, sustav socijalne skrbi, socijalni 
transferi, Hrvatska
